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Abstract: 
The paper carries out a deep case study of the international aid that Equatorial Guinea 
receives. This is an extremely interesting country because, not being a failed state, it 
presents very low indexes in institutional quality. Its oil richness, which began to be 
exploited by foreign investors in 1996, has meant a structural change of extraordinary 
interest without the traditional effects of Dutch disease. While in 1989 the country 
financed 54% of its GDP with ODA, in 1996 this ratio represented only 22% and 
nowadays barely reaches 0.5% thanks to the enormous growth of foreign investment. 
The article analyses empirically the predictability of the ODA flows -mainly composed 
of Spanish funds-, their stability, cyclical behaviour and stabilizing effect on the GDP. 
The main findings of the study are that the ODA has been a hardly predictable, 
relatively stable, counter-cyclical flow and that it does have a stabilizing effect on its 
product. The FDI (Direct Foreign Investment), on the other hand is much more volatile 
and pro-cyclical, although it shares the stabilizing effect of the ODA. For every million 
dollars of the FDI, GDP grew 0.1%. Development aid, on the contrary, doesn’t have a 
statistically significant impact if we consider the time period 1985-2006. But it does in 
1985-1995. Every additional million dollars of ODA made the GDP grow 1.3%. The 
sectoral analysis of ODA revealed that more than 80% of Spanish aid has been invested 
in social services, especially education (46%) and healthcare (26%), carried out by two 
NGOs that somehow became accomplices of the social underdevelopment that the 
Guinean government maintains since its independence. The article concludes with some 
ideas on how to improve the quality of Spanish ODA, especially proposing a deadline 
for the aid and a result-based conditionality, like the Aid Efficiency Agenda of Accra 
suggests. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
The case study of Equatorial Guinea is extremely interesting. Although we can’t find 
the most harmful effects of political instability that characterise a failed state, it is a 
clearly weak and non-democratic state. As we will see in the case study, the country 
presents high levels of corruption and very low features in institutional quality indexes. 
The abundance in oil reserves which began to be exploited by foreign investors in 1996 
has lead to an extraordinarily interesting structural change, in which we don’t find the 
traditional effects of Dutch disease. In 1989 the ratio ODA/GDP reached 54%. In 1996 
it represented only 22% and nowadays it barely reaches 0.5% thanks to the huge growth 
of foreign investment, especially american. This investment extracts the oil wealth 
found in Equatorial Guinea’s territorial sea but hardly leaves any observable benefits to 
the local population. Similar to the political effects of the ‘curse of natural resources’, 
the leading oligarchy of the country uses this income as if it were their property and 
they take it for their own benefit with almost no redistribution among the citizens. The 
basic public services are still given and financed by the old motherland, Spain, through 
the Official Development Aid (ODA). So we see that Equatorial Guinea presents many 
peculiar aspects that have been studied in development literature.  
On one hand, we can’t blame the oil generated income for the bad government of the 
country because it already existed before the oil exploitation began. The population 
hasn’t had a truly democratic and legitimate government almost since its independence 
from Spain in 1968. 
At the same time, the size of GDP and GDP per capita has been growing exponentially 
since 1996, when the massive oil exploitation began. Equatorial Guinea clearly reflects 
the limitations that the GDP per capita has as an indicator of well-being. While the real 
GDP per capita has grown ten times its former size between 1996 and 2005, the 
material and human poverty continues to be the main attribute of most of the country’s 
half million inhabitants. The inequality between the opulence of the leading clan and the 
citizens is outraging (although its measures have never been reliable). 
In third place, the FDI has become the main financing flow of the Guinean product, 
replacing the ODA. The relationship between these two flows hasn’t been studied very 
much, by which the empirical analysis of this case study is ground-breaking. 
We can also see that Equatorial Guinea gives Spain many leadership opportunities as an 
international donor, but also huge challenges regarding the quality and efficiency of the 
ODA. Until now it has been aimed towards basic education and healthcare in the 
country and carried out mainly by NGOs. But the perpetuation in time and without 
deadline of these financial supports, in some way makes the aid and NGOs accomplices 
of the country’s bad government. It’s easy for the administration to see the ODA as the 
opportunity cost of a more equal reallocation of the oil income, a higher fiscal pressure 
and a more responsible commitment to the quality and maintenance of the most basic 
public services like education and healthcare. 
Spain must find alternative ways to the current managing of the ODA in Equatorial 
Guinea.  
The paper’s structure is the following: The second section describes briefly the low 
institutional quality of the country and its economic structure. The third section carries 
out an empirical analysis of the predictability, stability, procyclicality and stabilizing 
impact of the ODA and FDI in the time period 1985-2006. The fourth section deeply 
analyses the ODA in Equatorial Guinea and the lead role that Spain has, paying 
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attention to the volatility in the aid flow and its sectoral stucture, especially focusing on 
education and healthcare. The fifth section contains suggestions for the Spanish ODA to 
increase its quality and efficiency. The sixth section summarises the main conclusions 
of the study. 
 
2. STYLIZED FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY. 
2.1. POLITICAL SITUATION 
The political situation in Equatorial Guinea can hardly be considered democratic. It’s 
more like a dictatorship inserted in a disorganized society (Roig 1996). The country’s 
independence from Spain was acknowledged in October 12th 1968, during the 
government of Francisco Macías Nguema. He established a very hard dictatorship, after 
killing all of his opponents, and proclaimed himself president for life in 1972. He was 
overthrown on August 3rd 1979 by his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema who used the 
paradoxical slogan of “coup de liberté”. Obiang has won the past five elections that take 
place every seven years (the last one on November 29th 2009). The electoral victories 
have been so demolishing that currently 99% of the Congress is composed by members 
of the only party in the dictatorship, the Democratic Party for Equatorial Guinea 
(PDEG). The remaining 1% is held by Convergence for a Social Democracy (CPDS) 
whose leader, Plácido Micó, declared that the electoral process was a fraud. The 
existing Government-in-exile was created in 2003 and is lead from Spain by Severo 
Moto, leader of the Equatorial Guinea Progress Party (PPGE). In March 2004 a group 
of South-African mercenaries, among which Margaret Thatcher’s son was found, 
attempted a coup d’état. They were detained in Zimbabwe and the attempt failed 
(Human Right Watch 2009 a). 
Ever since Teodoro Obiang took charge of the government there have been numerous 
political murders and missing people, as well as ‘false’ trials with no procedural 
warranties. The judicial power is not independent (The Freedom House 2009; Gorozpe 
2006; Roig 1996). The reports of International Amnesty (2008, 2009 a,b) and other 
independent organisms inform us about a shocking truth regarding arbitrary detentions, 
horrible tortures, beatings and murders, even to exiled opposing leaders. The corruption 
in Equatorial Guinea is systemic (Mbo Oda 2010; Human Rights Watch 2009 a,b; 
United States Senate 2004; Roig 1996). International Transparency sets the country in 
position 171 of 179 and assures that corruption is rampant, especially in oil investments 
and the negotiation of mercantile contracts.  
The organization The Freedom House qualifies Equatorial Guinea as a non-free country, 
having the worst mark (a 7) both in political freedom and civil rights. The refusal to 
hand out visas and the tortures in prisons are permanently denounced.  
Governance indicators. 
In the ranking of ‘State Weakness in Developing Countries’, carried out by Rice & 
Patrick (2008) which orders 141 countries from weakest to strongest, Equatorial Guinea 
was placed in position 25 within the first quintile with an aggregate value of 4.77 over 
10. The first quintile contains the weakest 28 countries in the world, in an index that 
synthesizes five components. The economic situation and GDP per cápita, in which 
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Equatorial Guinea obtains marks more suitable for the highest quintile: 7.51 over 10 in 
‘economic situation’ with a GDP per capita equals to 8.250 dollars. In the ‘security’ 
component it obtains 7.95 points which falls in the third quintile in terms of security. 
The worst two components are ‘social welfare’ in which it gets 1.91 points and 
‘politics’ with 1.73 points over 10. Both indicators are in the lowest quintile of the 
whole sample. 
The Heritage Foundation elaborates the index of economic freedom and has ranked 
Equatorial Guinea in position 151 of 179 (for 2010), within the group of ‘repressed’ 
countries and with 48.6 points over 100. This means a loss of 2.7 points with respect to 
2009. The components of the 10 freedoms that the index considers are showed below: 
Table 1. Components of the Index of Economic Freedom 2010. 
Equatorial 
Guinea’s 
Value 
COMPONENT 
Average of 
171 countries
Equatorial 
Guinea’s 
Value 
COMPONENT 
Average of 
171 countries 
44.8 Business Freedom 64.6 20.0 Investment Freedom 49.0 
58.9 Trade Freedom 74.2 40.0 Financial Freedom  48.5 
75.5 Fiscal Freedom 75.4 20.0 Property Rights 43.8 
83.9 Government Spending 65.0 17.0 Freedom from Corruption 40.5 
80.9 Monetary Freedom  70.6 44.8 Labour Freedom  62.1 
Source: http://www.heritage.org/index/Country/EquatorialGuinea.  
As we can see in the table, only public expenditure and monetary and fiscal freedom are 
above the sample mean. In 2010, 8 of the 10 indicators got a worse mark than that of the 
year before (the only two exceptions were monetary and fiscal freedom that stayed the 
same). 
All the governance indicators put together by Kaufmann et al (2009) show bad results. 
The ratings are in the worst decile when compared with the rest of the countries, except 
for political stability which is in the second worst quartile. As is shown in Graph 1, in 
2008 five of the indicators were below -1.31 taking the lowest values in Voice and 
Accountability and Control of Corruption (position 198 of the 202 countries with data, 
ordered from best to worst). 
                                                 
 
1 The governance indicators are ranged between [-2.5;+2.5], being -2.5 the minimum value. The exact 
values for 2008, with the standard error in brackets were: Voice and Accountability -1,89 (0,16); Political 
Stability -0,09 (0,25); Government Effectiveness -1,43 (0,22); Regulatory Quality -1,37 (0,18); Rule of 
Law -1,31 (0,17); Control of Corruption -1,62 (0,21).  
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Graph 1. Governance Indicators in Equatorial Guinea: 1996-2008. 
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Source: Kaufmann et al (2009). 
In the ranking of national risk elaborated by Institutional Investor Equatorial Guinea is 
in position 113 out of 178 with 29.7 points. In the Index of economic freedom 
(developed by The Heritage Foundation) it has also went down from position 133 in 
2006 to position 140 out of 179 in 2009. The country also occupies the last positions in 
the ranking made in the report Doing Business of the World Bank, where it holds 
position 170 of 183 in 2009. Among the indicators included in this report we can find 
some in the lowest quartile, such as ‘days needed to start a business’ (136, in contrast 
with 49.6 in Sub-Saharian Africa and 21.1 in high income countries in which Equatorial 
Guinea is included) and ‘number of procedures to start one’ (20, opposed to 10 in Sub-
Saharian Africa and 6.9 in high income countries).  The trend in these last years has 
been worsening in some indicators like ‘registering property’, ‘getting credit’, 
‘protecting investors’. At the same time, it holds the last place among the 183 countries 
in ‘closing a business’. 
An additional fact of the lack of institutional transparency is Equatorial Guinea’s 
incapacity to comply with the validation conditions required by the EITI (Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative). On April 29th 2010, EITI’s chairman of the board, 
Peter Eigen announced officially that there would be no extending of the validation 
period petitioned one month before by president Obiang (EITI 2010). 
Summarising, Equatorial Guinea is one of the worst countries in the world regarding 
juridical and institutional security to make business, being qualified as ‘criminal state’ 
(Wood 2004), characterised by a high level of corruption and the absence of 
accountability and involvement of the civil society in the decisions that affect them. In 
Equatorial Guinea we find almost perfectly the structure of incentives for a dictator to 
stay in power that Collier (2009) exposed, along with electoral manipulation and the use 
of foreign aid for egocentrical usufruct. 
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2.2 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION. 
The statistical data on Equatorial Guinea is scarce and not very reliable. For example, 
the estimates on population vary from 659,197 inhabitants in 2008 (World Bank, World 
Development Indicators), to 599.760 (PWT 6.3); or 633.441 en 2009 (CIA 2009 World 
Factbook) against the official census of 2001 that announced 1.014.999 inhabitants. 
The Human Development Report 2009 places Equatorial Guinea in rank 118 of 182, 
with an HDI (Human Development Index) of 0.719 (for 2007) which places it in the 
high zone of medium human development. Its life expectancy at birth is 49.9 years, the 
literacy ratio in adults is 87%, the combined ratio of school enrolment is 62% and 
income per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 30.6272. Equatorial Guinea is the 
country with greatest difference in the development indicator, if we compare its rank in 
the HDI with the rank it would take if we only took its GDP per capita into account (90 
positions higher). In fact, the values for income per capita in the countries immediately 
above and below in the HDI ranking are extremely lower: the one above is Moldavia 
and its GDP per capita is 2.551 dollars, and the one below, Uzbekistan, has a GDP per 
capita of 2.425 dollars. 
Equatorial Guinea’s emigration rate is 14.5% being the main destinations other African 
countries. Posee una tasa de emigración del 14.5% siendo otros países africanos los 
principales destinos. It is estimated that in 2005 barely 1% of the population (5.800 
inhabitants) were immigrants, coming mainly from neighbour countries like Cameroon, 
Gabon or Nigeria. 
The fertility rate has varied slightly between 1990-95 (5.9 children per woman) and 
2005-2010 (5.4 children). 
The Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) takes value 31.9 and places the country in rank 98 of 
135. Of the whole population of Equatorial Guinea, 34.5% wouldn’t pass the 40 years 
of life expectancy at birth, 13% is illiterate, 57% doesn’t have access to clean water and 
19% of the children younger than five have malnutrition. There aren’t periodical 
surveys providing information about the population in extreme poverty (less than 1.25$ 
a day), or the levels of inequality of income (Gini index or others3). 
The Gender Development Index places the country in position 102 (taking value 0.7) 
remarking the great difference between the income per capita of men (45.418 dollars 
PPP) and women (16.161 dollars PPP). Only 6% of the seats in the Congress are 
occupied by women, and only 14% of the jobs in the ministries. 
The data on military expense is very scarce. The SIPRI data base (2009) only contains 
data for the period 1994-95. In 1995 the military expense reached 5.5 million constant 
                                                 
 
2 Spain’s is 31.560 dollars CCP taking position 15 in the HDI ranking and 27 in the GDP per capita. 
Equatorial Guinea is, therefore, between Spain and Italy in the GDP per capita world ranking. 
3 Neither the World Bank data base (Povcalnet) nor the UNU-WIDER’s (WIID2c) provide any 
information regarding inequality in Equatorial Guinea. 
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2005 dollars, which is 2.1% of the GDP. The estimation for 2006 (CIA 2009) is 0.1% of 
the GDP. 
The economic evolution of the real product per capita is marked by the oil extraction 
carried out by American firms since 1996. Nowadays, the estimated oil production is 
359.220 barrels a day, all of it off-shore (CIA 2009), which makes Equatorial Guinea 
the fourth South-African producer (after Nigeria, Angola and Sudan) and the 35th in the 
world. At the same time it’s the 45th producer of Natural Gas with a total volume of 
6.670 million cubic metres in 2009. Oil and gas constitute close to 95% of the 
government’s income and almost 99% of the country’s exports (World Bank 2009). Due 
to the fact that its economy is extraverted and dependent on the petrol production, its 
income is attached to the volatile price of oil. This explains the bad economic activity in 
2009, with a 1.8% decrease of the GDP (CIA 2009). 
Equatorial Guinea could turn out to be a country affected by the so called ‘Dutch 
disease” effect (Basedau & Lacher 2006; McSharry 2006; Campos 2010). Nevertheless, 
authors such as Toto (2008) do not support this hypothesis for Equatorial Guinea. The 
small size of the manufacturing sector (2% of the GDP according to Toto 2008:16) and 
the primary sector (the traditional tradable goods have been cocoa, wood and coffee), 
would prevent it from being negatively affected by the Dutch disease because the 
entrance of currency provided by the sale of oil and the consequent appreciation of the 
exchange rate don’t end up in the financial system (they are captured by the political 
elite) and don’t emphasize the price raise4. In contrast, Toto (2008:16) defends that the 
abundance of oil has generated incentives for a reallocation of resources and productive 
factors (especially after the Nigerian labour in cocoa production left), allowing an 
economic transformation that the government on its own wouldn’t be willing to do. The 
enhancement of basic services (education, healthcare, water supply and sanitation), the 
agricultural productivity or tourism, are sectors to which public resources obtained by 
the oil generated income could be allocated. This way, the low social indicators of 
Equatorial Guinea would rise; like the 66% of the population without access to clean 
water, the rate of child mortality being 123.6 for every thousand or the maternal 
mortality rate equal to 680 for every 100.000 births (World Bank, WDI 2009). In this 
context what Frankel (2010) proposes about reallocating the petrol generated income 
equally among the population is quite relevant and Devarajan et al (2010) support this 
policy.  The neighbour country Gabon is an example of the different ways countries 
with similar oil income can manage them5. Distributing the earnings among the 
population and then collecting taxes generates a more efficient economic system and a 
much more transparent accountability. A fiscal system which is transparent with its 
income and efficient with its redistributive expenses towards the population are two 
reforms that the country needs urgently. 
                                                 
 
4 Taking 1996=100 for a base, prices in 2008 had grown 8.8%, estimated with the CPI. Own calculations 
using information from WDI 2009 of the World Bank.  
5 See Basedau & Lacher 2008 for the comparison between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Gabon spends 
comparatively much more in education and healthcare. It has a lower level of corruption, but its oil 
income per capita is 3.4 times lower and the public spending per capita is almost twice as much as in 
Guinea (1.189 dollars per capita in Gabon against 611 in Guinea). 
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Equatorial Guinea’s case seems to support the idea that the so called ‘natural resources 
curse’ is conditioned to countries with bad institutions (Mehlum, Moene & Torvik 
2006) and it’s not the sole fact of resource abundance what creates delays in economic 
growth (Sachs & Warner 2001). The causal direction may be double. Corruption and 
lack of transparency in public accounts along with other inefficient institutions are now 
fed by the oil sales income, but were fed before by the external aid. Political repression 
and the absence of certain liberties and rights already existed before oil became the 
principal financial source of the regime. The overabundant resource hasn’t been the 
cause of the violence, insecurity, impunity and impoverishment, since these 
characteristics existed -with the same ruler- before 1996 when the oil FDI grew. 
Nevertheless it has had an enormous contribution in financing military spending 
through foreign companies (Frynas 2004; EIU 2005). Foreign investors take advantage 
of the dysfunctional legal frame to extract oil and gas in their own benefit, not worrying 
about the fact that the country’s government stays in office without democratic 
legitimacy and that the benefits of these natural resources never reach the majority of 
the population. In this vicious circle there’s no middle class capable of demanding more 
fiscal transparency because it provides more fund collection, or basic public goods (in 
quantity and quality). Therefore, the elites remain in power ignoring the general interest 
of the country. As we will see further on, the ODA may be an accomplice of this 
perverse mechanism. 
The evolution of the oil production can be seen in graph 2. 
Graph 2. Evolution of oil production in Equatorial Guinea. 
 
Source: Taken from EIA (2009). 
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As graph 3 shows, in 1996 the real GDP per capita hardly passed 2.300 constant 2005 
dollars6. The next year it reached 5.000$ and by 1999 it had passed 7.000$. The growth 
trend has been unstoppable, by which in 2002 it exceeded 16.500$, in 2004 22.000$ and 
in 2005 it reached the maximum of 23.444 dollars. 
We can see in table 2 that the growth rate of the period 1960-2007 was 6.4%, being the 
decade with the greatest rate 1990-2000 (20,2%) followed by the period 2000-2007 
(14,7%). In the 80’s, the absence of reforms and the dependence on cocoa and wood 
exports meant a decrease in -3.1%7. The arrival of foreign investment for the 
exploitation of natural resources set a turning point of the growth trend in 1997. The 
growth during 1960-1996 was a 1.7%, whereas in 1997-2007 it was 16.2%. 
Graph 3. Evolution of Equatorial Guinea’s real GDP: 1960-2007. 
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Table 2. Cummulative growth rates of real GDP per capita. 
1960-70 2,2% 1960-1996 1,7% 
1970-80 2,2% 1997-2007 16,2% 
                                                 
 
6 The data about the GDP per capita is very sensible to the PWT version. The correlation between PWT 
6.3 and PWT 6.2 is 0.994, but between 6.3 and 6.1 only 0.131. Johnson et al. (2009) use Equatorial 
Guinea as an example for being the second African country with greatest economical growth in years 
1975-1999 if we use PWT 6.2, with rate 4%, or the first country with worst performance if we use PWT 
6.1, with rate -2.7%. 
7 See Morillas (2001) for details on the structural change carried out during 1991-1996 and Morillas 
(2004) for a description of the economic structure at the end of the 90’s. For a more current description of 
this growth model without development see Gorozpe (2006). 
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1980-90 -3,1% 1960-2007 6,4% 
1990-2000 20,2% 
2000-07 14,7% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Heston et al (2009). 
The economic performance reveals growth rates higher than 5% in 22 of 48 years, and 
negative growths in 17 interannual periods. The two largest growths were in 1997 
(118%) and 1996 (74%) after the arrival of American investment for the extraction of 
oil and gas. 
International trade has been beneficial for the country, which faced a surplus of 1.420 
million dollars in 2008. The main exporters to Guinea are United States (22%), Spain 
(18%), China (14%) and France (8%), which are at the same time the main importers of 
Guinean products: China (17%), Spain (13%), United States (12%) and France (11%).  
The inflation rate in 2009 reached 4.5% (7.5% in 2008), the interest rate of the Central 
Bank 4.75%, the public debt 1.1% of the GDP and the external debt 190 million dollars. 
The estimated rate of investment in 2009 is 44% (CIA 2009) which is the second 
greatest in the world (between Seychelles 45.8% and China 42.6%). According to 
United Nations (2009) the country has made a strong structural change. In 1985 65% of 
the total production was agricultural and had been so since the independence. The 
industrial sector represented only 10% and services an extra 25%. The present sectoral 
structure is clearly dominated by the industry (93.7%) especially extractive (oil and gas 
add up to 91%), as opposed to the 5% in services and 4% in the primary sector. 
The spectacular growth rate of the GDP per capita doesn’t imply human development 
for the majority of the population. The oil generated income hardly leaves any benefits 
for the disadvantaged population for various reasons. One of the main reasons is that 
98% of the income stays in hands of the American (ExxonMobil, Hess and Marathon) 
and French firms, along with the Dictator’s family. His son Teodoro Obiang, Minister 
of Agriculture and Mining, receives directly in his account the taxes charged on the 
extraction of forest resources (Urbina 2009).  The dictatorship accepts and directly 
causes corrupt actions while developped countries with extraction interests turn a blind 
eye or even break their own legislation. For example, the United States allows the 
Dictator’s son, who receives over one million dollars in cash, to go to his mansion in 
California, despite the law promoted by the Bush Administration which denies access to 
the country to those suspected of corruption (Urbina 2009). The Dictator’s son’s income 
is connected to American banks such as Riggs Bank, Wachovia and Bank of America 
that have been rescued by the Reserve from their financial crisis in 2009. The estimated 
number of dollars only in the United States coming form corrupt actions is tens of 
millions. 
Which is the answer development aid donors give to this situation? That is what we try 
to analyze in the next section. 
3. ODA IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA. 
The lack of data, especially concerning social variables and public expenditure 
components, may explain that most part of the academic cross-sectional research on 
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topics like the relationship between aid and growth, the fungibility of aid, or the 
volatility of aid doesn’t include Equatorial Guinea in their samples. Due to this 
limitation, I have chosen to dedicate this section of the article on the most recent studies 
about the effectiveness of aid, focusing on the analysis of aid flows in contrast with the 
GDP, and other external financing sources like the Direct Foreign Investment (FDI) or 
remittances. A first approach will focus on the macroeconomic interrelations, whereas a 
second one will analyze Spain as main donor of ODA in Equatorial Guinea. 
3.1. MACROECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE AID RECEIVED BY 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
This section analyzes four global features of the ODA received by Equatorial Guinea: 
its predictability, stability, pro or counter-cyclicality, and the stabilizing effect on GDP. 
It also provides an analysis on the significance of variables like aid and foreign 
investment on the evolution of Equatorial Guinea’s GDP. 
Predictability is defined as the adaptation of the commitments taken by donors to the 
further payments made (Arellano et al. 2009; Celasum & Walliser 2008). The 
predictability indicator is the correlation between the commitments and the one-period 
delayed payments. 
The stability of the ODA flow is determined with the variation coefficient (VC) 
computed by the standard deviation divided by the mean, which is at the same time an 
approximate indicator of the volatility of aid. 
The pro or counter-cyclicality is captured in the correlation between aid (or direct 
foreign investment FDI, in its case) and the GDP8. 
Following the methodology used by Neagu & Schiff (2009), the stabilizing effect is 
measured comparing the VC of GDP plus ODA, and the VC of the GDP. If the first one 
is smaller, we can say that ODA has a stabilizing effect. The empirical evidence 
supports this characteristic in many aid-receiving countries (Neagu & Schiff 2009; 
Guillaumont & Tapsoba 2009). 
The data of the ODA comes from the data base ‘DAC’ of the OECD-DAC and are 
available for the period 1973-2008 if we care about all donors, and for 1987-2008 if we 
look for Spanish payments. The data regarding GDP and FDI are taken from the World 
Bank (World Development Indicators 2008). The time period with complete 
information for all three flows is 1985-2006, which, unless stated otherwise, is the one 
with which we’ll work on in this section. The series were obtained originally in current 
dollars and were later transformed into constant 2000 dollars using the American GDP 
deflator. Finally the trend has been eliminated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter using λ = 
100 as is usual in literature (Bulir & Hamann 2008; Hudson & Mosley 2008; Fielding & 
Mavrotas 2008). 
Predictability. 
We have calculated the correlation coefficient and the correlation of determination (R2) 
taking into account the commitments and payments in 1973-2008 (largest period with 
                                                 
 
8 The lack of data on the remittances rendered impossible the comparison with this private flow so 
important for other countries’ development financing (for a regional study with the same methodology as 
the one used here consult Neagu & Schiff 2009). 
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available data) in constant 2007 dollars. We have found them both for the annualized 
series as for the one-period delayed payments. The results show that the commitments 
don’t match with the further payments. The correlation for the paired data in the same 
year is 0.59 (R2=0.3484) and for the one-period delayed payments 0.69 (R2=0.4700) 
(Graph 4). 
Graph 4. Evolution of commitments and payments of the ODA in Equatorial Guinea. All donors. 
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Stability. 
The ODA in Equatorial Guinea is a much more stable flow than the GDP or the FDI. 
The VC of the aid is 0.42 (0.17 according to the filtered trend series), whereas the 
GDP’s is 1.74 (1.53 with filtered data) and the FDI’s is 1.58 (1.40). The low values of 
the VC confirm that aid is comparatively much more stable. 
Pro-cyclicality. 
The result of the correlation between GDP and ODA is 0.01 (greater than 0 and 
therefore pro-cyclical) if we take into account the series without eliminating the trend 
with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. In contrast, when we use the filter the correlation 
changes sign -0.46, which implies counter-cyclicality. To solve this ambiguity we use 
an alternative methodology (like Frot & Santiso 2008) which consists of computing the 
correlation between GDP and ODA of the series of five year mobile means. In this case 
the correlation coefficient takes a negative value -0.39 confirming the counter-cyclical 
character of aid. 
The pro-cyclical character of the FDI is very high, being its correlation with the GDP 
0.92 (non-filtered data) or 0.99 using the filtered series. 
Last of all it’s worthwhile to notice that the correlation between ODA and FDI is 
negative (-0.06 with non-filtered data, -0.5 with filtered data and -0.46 with five year 
mobile means).  
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To add up, while the ODA flow is much more stable than FDI and has a counter-
cyclical behaviour, there exists an inverse relationship between them. This fact takes us 
to analyze more carefully the existence of a substitution effect between aid and foreign 
investment. 
 
Stabilizing Effect. 
The VC of GDP plus ODA is 1.70, smaller than that of GDP alone (1.74), which 
implies that aid has a stabilizing effect in Equatorial Guinea. The same happens with the 
FDI. The VC of GDP+FDI is 1.689. 
In result the ODA flow in Equatorial Guinea is hardly predictable, stable, counter-
cyclical and stabilizer of the GDP. The FDI, on the other hand, is much more volatile 
and also pro-cyclical, even though it shares the stabilizing impact of the ODA. 
Linear Regression Model. 
To verify the contribution of FDI and ODA to the economic growth of Equatorial 
Guinea, we have estimated the following model: 
LogGDPt = α + βODAt + χFDIt + δDummy + υt    
The first regression of level data gave as result the existence of non-normal errors, serial 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. To avoid this the model was later tested with the 
dependant variable in Log form and included a dummy variable for the period 1997-
2007, after American FDI in Equatorial Guinea began10.  
The results of the estimated model with three alternative time periods are captured in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. Relation between GDP, ODA and FDI 
Dependent var.: logGDP 1 2 3 
Period 1985-2006 1985-1995 1996-2006 
Constant 3.25*** 4.02*** 6.61*** 
 0.30 0.13 0.32 
ODA 0.10 0.013*** -0.02 
 0.006 0.003 0.03 
FDI 0.001*** 0.005* 0.0014*** 
 0.0002 0.0005  
Dummy97-06 2.00***   
 0.43   
                                                 
 
9 The results are consistent using the series of five year means: the VC of GDP+ODA is 1.47 and the VC 
of GDP+FDI  is 1.49, both smaller than the VC of GDP alone: 1.51 
10 Other specifications like considering aid squared (to test the possibility of decreasing outcomes) or 
adding an interactive term between aid and investment didn’t provide statistically significant results. The 
existence of negative values didn’t allow hypothesis testing with smooth series. 
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R2 0.95 0.75 0.77 
F-test 131.9** 12.21** 13.43** 
Observations 22 11 11 
Note: In italics, standard errors consistent with heteroskedasticity. * significant at 90%; ** significant at 
95%; *** significant at 99%. 
The ODA didn’t have a significant impact in the period 1985-2006 or 1996-2006, but it 
did during 1985-1995. However, the FDI was significant in the first subperiod and gets 
stronger after 1996. If we focus on the whole period, the significance of the FDI is 
strong (t-statistic 8.23 and a parameter 0.002 if we use a regression without aid). The 
importance of the structural change taken place in 1996 can be proven thanks to the 
significance of the dummy variable for the period 1997-2006. For every extra million 
USD in FDI, the GDP grows 0.1%11. 
The parameters’ correlation matrix turned out to be: 
 Log GDP ODA FDI 
Log GDP 1   
ODA -0,22 1  
FDI 0,87 -0,06 1 
GDP and FDI have a strong positive correlation, whereas ODA presents a negative 
correlation with GDP and FDI, being the latter very weak. 
Very similar results are obtained if we make the regression of the same model taking the 
log of GDP per capita and the quantities of ODA and FDI in current dollars for the 
period 1986-2006. The ODA’s coefficient is -0.02 significant at 98%, and the 
coefficient of the FDI is 0.001 significant at 99%, passing the tests in note 9, with an R2 
equal to 0.85 and F-test=54.47**. 
We can conclude that Equatorial Guinea’s GDP is tightly attached to foreign 
investment. For every million dollars in FDI, the GDP grew 0.1%. Aid, in turn, doesn’t 
have a statistically significant impact during the period 1985-2006, although it did in the 
first half. A million extra dollars in ODA made the GDP grow 1.3%.  
The question if whether or not aid has had some impact on other economic or social 
variables, especially poverty, arises immediately. The lack of data on poverty in 
Equatorial Guinea makes it impossible to analyze this effect directly. Nevertheless, in 
the next section we carry out a thorough analysis of the source of aid and the most 
assisted sectors, as an indirect way of learning the potential benefits of this flow. 
                                                 
 
11 The model passed the normality tests AR(1-2), ARCH(1-1), Heteroskedasticity and RESET. The 
corresponding values are available for those interested. 
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4. THE ODA IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA. SPAIN’S LEAD ROLE. 
Thanks to the information provided by the World Bank (2009), in the mid-80’s 
Equatorial Guinea received more than 22% of its GDP in ODA. This ratio grew up to 
54% in 1989, and has decreased ever since. In 1996, when the investment in oil began, 
it went down to 15%. From this moment on Equatorial Guinea has reduced its 
dependence on ODA. A year later (1997), the ratio ODA/GDP was already 6% and has 
followed a monotone decrease down to 0.5% in 2006 and 2007. We can find a similar 
evolution if we look at aid per capita. The series reaches its maximum in 1991 at 158 
dollars and goes down to 42 dollars in 2006, finding a minimum at 24 dollars in 2001. 
Regarding the gross capital formation, the aid accounted for 262% of it in 1990, 10% in 
1996 and barely 0.7% in 2007. 
From 1973 to 2008 (for which there is available data in the OECD’s data base DAC), 
Equatorial Guinea received 1.505 million dollars (ODA net payments measured in 
constant 2007 dollars). Table 4 shows the breakdown by donors of this total amount.  
The number of active donors, both bilateral and multilateral, has been pretty much 
constant since the late 80’s, around 20 donors and a maximum of 23 agents operating 
simultaneously, of the 61 with available information. On average, 11-12 bilateral donors 
and some more multilateral donors operate in the country, in addition to the 2-3 donors 
that are not members of the DAC (Graph 5). Among these, the most important are the 
loans given by Arab countries during 1985-91 (up to 9.6 million dollars) which are 
generating repayments (negative net ODA) since year 2000 (reaching 3.5 million 
dollars). Another remarkable aspect is the 10-11 constant multilateral donors since 
1995. There has also been a strong decrease in bilateral donors in 2007 with only five 
remaining (Canada, France, Japan, Spain and United States). Since 1987, where we start 
to find information for Spain, only France and Japan have maintained their 
contributions every year up to 2008. In any case, this figure is much lower than the 
mean of the receiving countries (28 in 2006: 19 bilateral and 9 multilateral; according to 
Frot & Santiso 2008).  
Spain has been the main donor with almost 467 million dollars, close to 31% of the 
total. Together with France, it has been the most active bilateral donor, and both sum up 
more than half of the aid given to Equatorial Guinea. Among the multilateral organisms, 
the European Commission and the UNDP have made the greatest contributions, 
representing 15% of the net ODA. It’s interesting to notice that seven of the ten largest 
donors are multilateral. 
 
 16
Table 4. ODA in Equatorial Guinea 1973-2007 
 Donor Million USD % 
Accumulated 
%  Donor 
Million 
USD % 
Accumulated 
% 
 All Donors, Total 1505.04 100.00% 18 IFAD 9.1 0.60% 97.94%
 
DAC 
Countries, 
Total 
907.53 60.30% 19 Canada 8.31 0.55% 98.50%
 Multilateral, Total 525.37 34.91% 20 Sweden 5.3 0.35% 98.85%
 
Non-DAC 
Countries, 
Total 
72.14 4.79% 21 Switzerland 5.28 0.35% 99.20%
1 Spain 466.92 31.02% 31.02% 22 UNHCR 4.76 0.32% 99.52%
2 France 307.54 20.43% 51.46% 23 Netherlands 2.99 0.20% 99.71%
3 EC 147.81 9.82% 61.28% 24 Arab agencies 2.77 0.18% 99.90%
4 UNDP 81.66 5.43% 66.70% 25 Belgium 2.73 0.18% 100%
5 Arab countries 71.56 4.75% 71.46% 26 Luxembourg 1.81 0.12% 100%
6 IDA 67.38 4.48% 75.94% 27 United Kingdom 1.46 0.10% 100%
7 AfDF 56.83 3.78% 79.71% 28 Norway 0.55 0.04% 100%
8 WFP 50.44 3.35% 83.06% 29 Korea 0.31 0.02% 100%
9 Italy 37.88 2.52% 85.58% 30 Turkey 0.23 0.02% 100%
10 UNTA 33.27 2.21% 87.79% 31 Portugal 0.22 0.01% 100%
11 Germany 31.07 2.06% 89.86% 32 Austria 0.18 0.01% 100%
12 UNICEF 24.89 1.65% 91.51% 33 UNAIDS 0.12 0.01% 100%
13 United States 23.22 1.54% 93.05% 34 Greece 0.09 0.01% 100%
14 UNFPA 23.03 1.53% 94.58% 35 Finland 0.09 0.01% 100%
15 Global Fund 16.35 1.09% 95.67% 36 Other donors 0.04 0.00% 100%
16 IMF Trust Fund 13.28 0.88% 96.55% 37 Ireland 0.02 0.00% 100%
17 Japan 11.87 0.79% 97.34% 38 IMF (SAF,ESAF,PRGF) -6.32 
-
0.42% 
Source: OECD-DAC data. 
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Graph 5. Evolution of the number of active donors. 
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Another proper feature of Guinean aid is the donor concentration. Only six donors cover 
75% of the aid received. Opposite to the rest of Africa in which the number of donors is 
quickly increasing, Equatorial Guinea can well be an example of the so called ‘aid 
orphans’. Even so, between 1973 and 2008 Equatorial Guinea received ODA funds 
from 38 donors. In the last year for which we can find data (2008), there were only 23 
active donors: 10 bilateral, 10 multilateral and 3 non-DAC donors. Anyways, Spain has 
always been the donor with greatest contributions. 
Spain’s lead role can be seen in Graph 5. Since 1995 the Spanish contribution has been 
greater than 40% of the total ODA in Equatorial Guinea, in many cases reaching 60% 
(the maximum is found in 2007 at 64.4%). 
Regarding the stability of its annual flows, Spain is one of the least volatile countries 
(measured with the variation coefficient). Occupying position 29 of 34 with a VC equal 
to 0.38 (Table 5). 
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Graph 5. Spanish ODA compared with the total 
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Table 5. Volatility of the donors’ ODA in Equatorial Guinea. 1973-2007. 
Donor VC Donor VC 
Arab Agencies 8.99 European Commission 
(EC) 
0.77 
Arab Countries 3.29 France 0.71 
World Bank (IDA) 1.78 UNAIDS 0.71 
Luxembourg 1.64 UNDP 0.67 
IFAD 1.6 UNICEF 0.65 
AfDF 1.57 WFP 0.63 
Switzerland 1.51 UNTA 0.51 
United Kingdom 1.37 Global Fund 0.46 
UNHCR 1.35 UNFPA 0.41 
Canada 1.22 Norway 0.39 
Netherlands 1.12 Greece 0.39 
Germany 1.02 SPAIN 0.38 
Italy 1.01 Austria 0.35 
Japan 1.00 Portugal 0.18 
Belgium 0.84 Finland 0.16 
United States 0.82 Other Donors 0.00 
South Korea 0.79 IMF (SAF,ESAF,PRGF) -11.33 
Source: OCDE-DAC data. The negative variation coefficient of the IMF is due to the net character of the 
ODA (meaning that there were greater repayments from Guinea than new loans). 
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Sectoral Analysis. 
Once we have shown the importance that Spain has in quantitative aid to Equatorial 
Guinea, the next step is to analyze the sectoral distribution of its flows. Table 6 
summarises this sectoral division following the classification of the DAC and including 
different levels of disintegration (from 1 to 3 digits). We compare the percentual 
distribution of the total aid of all donors together (columns 1 and 2) with Spain’s aid 
(columns 3 and 4), and the difference between them (column 4-2, where positive sign 
means a greater Spanish percentage, and negative sign indicates a higher percentage of 
all donors). Last of all, we compare Spain with the rest of the donors (excluding Spanish 
aid, last three columns). The first column shows the stock of aid in 1997-2008, whereas 
the last one shows the percentage over the total. 
The main Spanish features are the following. More than 80% of Spanish aid is spent on 
social services, especially education (46%) and healthcare (26%). Here we can find the 
greatest difference with the percentage structure of all donors and of the other donors 
(excluding Spain). An important part of this aid is conducted by the NGOD (FERE for 
education and FRS for healthcare)12. Apart form Spain, the aid for education of the rest 
of the donors is 8% and 11% for healthcare. Taking into account the aid of all donors 
(including Spain) education takes 28% of it and healthcare 19%. Both sectors are, by 
large, the most important of all. 
A possible interpretation of this data is that the Spanish aid substitutes a big 
responsibility of the Guinean state, which is to finance its basic public services. This 
explanation is supported if we take into account the income obtained by the Guinean 
state with the petrol exports. If this income were used to finance basic public services, 
especially for the disadvantaged population, the resources coming from aid could be 
used in other areas, or progressively withdrawn. The aid flows to education and 
healthcare remain with practically no variation throughout the eleven years. The mean 
in education is 8.9 million dollars, with a standard deviation equal to 1.3 million. 
Healthcare received on average 4.9 million dollars with a standard deviation equal to 
1.6 million. The VCs of these two areas are the lowest of all.   
Another feature of the sectoral distribution of Spanish aid is the amount spent on 
Governance and Civil Society. In a country often criticized for its weak democracy, 
transparency and inobservance of human, civil, and political rights, the aid sent to this 
sector would denote a development policy very welcome by the Guinean civil society 
and the impoverished. The average amount spent in this sector was 0.3 and had a 
standard deviation equal to 0.26, which gives us a high volatility (VC=0.84).The 
accumulated amount of the whole period is 3.59 million dollars, with a maximum 0.78 
in 2007. The record of the 11th Mixed Commission for 2009-2011 points out as first 
                                                 
 
12 According to sources of FRS, the Federation has been working on healthcare in Equatorial Guinea 
since 1979. That year the Foreign Affairs Office asked it to work in the Technical Cooperation Plan 
between Spain and Equatorial Guinea. There has since been a continuous collaboration. In 2010 there 
were 35 people working in exile and 149 locals. In total they managed 173 health centres in 271 villages. 
During 1980-2000 the aid specialized in primary healthcare and hospital assistance. In 2001 they ceased 
their work in hospitals after receiving support form Cuban cooperation. Between 2001 and 2004 they 
have promoted the development of communitarian health areas in 9 districts. The personnel of FRS 
currently work in a public hospital a public and a private health centre and in a clinical analysis 
laboratory. 
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priority the “Enhancement of the social and institutional capacities in the democratic 
governance, citizen involvement, and institutional improvement sectors” (AECID 
2009:5). The breakdown of the scheduled programs and activities refer to a series of 
courses and technical assistances for diplomats, judges and civil society with a 
questionable direct impact on the disadvantaged population. Furthermore, with no 
commitments regarding deadlines or quantities, everything is subject to free 
interpretation, looking more like a shopping list than a truly result-oriented association 
frame, like the rhetoric of the Record and Master Plan 2009-2012 declares. 
The catchall of “Other services and social infrastructures” gathers 6% of the aid 
received between 1997 and 2008. The remaining social services subsectors are water 
supply and sanitation which cover 1.1% and population and reproductive health, 0.9%. 
The sector that has received more aid after education and healthcare is the external debt 
relief. It covers 11% of the aid with a total amount of 24.5 million dollars. The other 
donors gave this sector another 29.9 million dollars (15% in their sectoral structure). 
The statistics of the DAC give us three consecutive years: 2003 (3.2 million dollars), 
2004 (9.5 million) and 2005 (11.7 million). The Record of the 11th Mixed Commission 
states that in 2003 two programs for debt conversion were signed. One for public 
investment debts (27.8 million euros) which finance the construction of three high 
schools and the future construction of a hospital with a tropical diseases research centre. 
The other was for private investment debts (16.3 million euros) without specific 
destinations (“available for entrepreneurs that chose to join in”). According to the Debt 
and Globalization Observatory (ODG) with the data base of the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, Equatorial Guinea owed Spain 16.41 million dollars on December 31st 
2007, which was only 0.19% of the total debt towards Spain, all of it coming from the 
“CESCE debt”. 
The other sectors receive comparatively smaller amounts than those of education, 
healthcare and debt. For example, 1.5% spent on environment (included in 
Multisectoral), 1.4% on agriculture, 1% on industry or 0.4% on energy.  
Table 6. Sectoral Distribution of Spanish ODA to Equatorial Guinea. 1997-2008. 
Commitments, constant 2007 USD millions 1997-2008 ALL donors SPAIN  All-Spain  
           M$ 2007 M$
2007 
% % %
Spain-
All 
M$ 
2007 
% %Spain-rest
donors 
            (1) (2) (3) (4) (4-2) (1-3) (5) (4-5)
ALL            413.06 100.0% 216.90 100.0% 196.16 100.0%
450: V. TOTAL SECTOR ALLOCABLE (I+II+III+IV) 342.26 82.9% 189.34 87.3% 4.4% 152.92 78.0% 9.3% 
450: V. TOTAL 
SECTOR ALLOCABLE 
100: I. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES 307.55 74.5% 177.79 82.0% 7.5% 129.75 66.1% 15.8% 
 100: I. SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES 
110: I.1. Education 115.88 28.1% 99.89 46.1% 18.0% 15.99 8.2% 37.9% 
           110: I.1.
Education 
 111: I.1.a. 
Education, Level 
Unspecified 
51.07 12.4% 38.14 17.6% 5.2% 12.93 6.6% 11.0%
   112: I.1.b. Basic 
Education 
27.83        6.7% 26.92 12.4% 5.7% 0.91 0.5% 12.0%
            113: I.1.c.
Secondary 
Education 
 17.34 4.2% 17.31 8.0% 3.8% 0.03 0.0% 8.0%
   114: I.1.d. Post-
Secondary 
Education 
19.64        4.8% 17.52 8.1% 3.3% 2.11 1.1% 7.0%
  120: I.2. Health  78.62 19.0% 56.16 25.9% 6.9% 22.45 11.4% 14.4% 
  130: I.3. Population Pol./Progr. & 
Reproductive Health
23.26        5.6% 2.05 0.9% -4.7% 21.20 10.8% -9.9%
  140: I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation 26.73 6.5% 2.28 1.1% -5.4% 24.45 12.5% -11.4% 
  150: I.5. Government & Civil Society 35.07 8.5% 3.59 1.7% -6.8% 31.48 16.0% -14.4% 
 22 
           150: I.5.
Government & 
Civil Society 
 151: I.5.a. 
Government & Civil 
Society-general 
34.94 8.5% 3.47 1.6% -6.9% 31.47 16.0% -14.4%
   152: I.5.b. Conflict, 
Peace & Security 
0.13        0.0% 0.12 0.1% 0.0% 0.01 0.0% 0.1%
  160: I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & 
Services 
27.99        6.8% 13.81 6.4% -0.4% 14.18 7.2% -0.9%
 200: II. ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 6.74 1.6% 1.05 0.5% -1.1% 5.69 2.9% -2.4% 
 200: II. ECONOMIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
SERVICES
210: II.1. Transport & Storage 4.83 1.2% 0.00 0.0% -1.2% 4.83 2.5% -2.5% 
  220: II.2. Communications 0.16 0.0% 0.15 0.1% 0.0% 0.01 0.0% 0.1% 
  230: II.3. Energy  0.90 0.2% 0.90 0.4% 0.2% 0.00 0.0% 0.4% 
  240: II.4. Banking & Financial Services 0.85        0.2% 0.00 0.0% -0.2% 0.85 0.4% -0.4%
  250: II.5. Business & Other Services 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 
 300: III. PRODUCTION SECTORS  11.25 2.7% 5.35 2.5% -0.3% 5.90 3.0% -0.5% 
 300: III. PRODUCTION 
SECTORS 
310: III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 8.36 2.0% 3.10 1.4% -0.6% 5.26 2.7% -1.3% 
  320: III.2. Industry, Mining, Construction         2.68 0.6% 2.25 1.0% 0.4% 0.43 0.2% 0.8%
  331: III.3.a. Trade Policies & Regulations 0.21 0.1% 0.00 0.0% -0.1% 0.21 0.1% -0.1% 
           332: III.3.b. Tourism 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0%
 400: IV. MULTISECTOR / CROSS-CUTTING 16.72 4.0% 5.15 2.4% -1.7% 11.57 5.9% -3.5% 
500: VI. COMMODITY AID / GENERAL PROG. ASS. 5.04 1.2% 0.00 0.0% -1.2% 5.04 2.6% -2.6% 
600: VII. ACTION RELATING TO DEBT  54.43 13.2% 24.52 11.3% -1.9% 29.91 15.2% -3.9% 
700: VIII. HUMANITARIAN AID   1.95 0.5% 0.18 0.1% -0.4% 1.77 0.9% -0.8% 
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910: IX. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF DONORS  4.35 1.1% 0.51 0.2% -0.8% 3.85 2.0% -1.7% 
920: X. SUPPORT TO NGO'S   0.50 0.1% 0.18 0.1% 0.0% 0.32 0.2% -0.1% 
930: XI. REFUGEES IN DONOR COUNTRIES  0.28        0.1% 0.19 0.1% 0.0% 0.09 0.0% 0.0%
998: XII. UNALLOCATED/UNSPECIFIED  4.24 1.0% 1.99 0.9% -0.1% 2.25 1.1% -0.2% 
Source: OECD-DAC, CRS On line. 
Details of Spanish ODA: analyzed through involved agents. 
In this section we present the stylized features of Spanish aid in Equatorial Guinea 
during the most recent period. The data in this section has been taken from the follow-
up reports PACI 2007 and 2008, and their respective spreadsheets provided by the 
General Direction of Planification and Evaluation of Development Policies 
(DGPOLDE). 
Bilateral ODA. 
According to the information given by the Foreign Affairs Office (MAEC 2008), in 
2008 Spain spent 9.560.240 euros in 59 operations (84 in 2007) of bilateral aid, (except 
for two multi-bilateral ones). That is, 0.29% of the total bilateral aid. Of these 
operations, 19 were carried out by the AECID; 6 by other ministries; 8 by Autonomous 
Communities (each one by a different community); 23 by city councils and 1 by a 
university (UNED). All of them were programs or projects, except for three which were 
intended for scholarships, formation and sensitization. 
The aid was conducted by national development NGOs (37), public Spanish entities 
(12), Spanish firms, local NGOD or networks (one each) and other entities (2). 
The type of the aid and the tools used by bilateral aid are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Spanish aid in Equatorial Guinea according to the tools used. 
 2008 2007 
Type # of Operations % # of Operations % 
Technical Cooperation 33 55.9% 27 32.1% 
Programs 6 10.2% 16 19.0% 
Investment Projects 4 6.8% 11 13.1% 
Other resources 16 27.1% 28 33.3% 
TOTAL 59 100% 84 100.0% 
Source: MAEC (2007, 2008). 
 
Table 8. Multilateral Spanish aid in Guinea Equatorial in 2008. 
Entity Euros % 
Global Fund* 130,838 30.6% 
UNICEF 21,149  4.9% 
UNDP 76,512  17.9% 
UNFPA 68,833  16.1% 
EC Budget 97,543  22.8% 
EDF 32,481  7.6% 
TOTAL 427,356 100% 
Note: * Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
Source: MAEC (2008). 
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Multilateral ODA. 
When we look at multilateral aid in 2008, we find that the ODA in Equatorial Guinea 
rose up to 427.356 euros, figuring as 0.03% of Spanish multilateral aid. Only eight of 
the 35 operations MAEC reported began in 2008, whereas the rest where contributions 
committed to in 2006 (4) or 2007 (23). Their final uses can be seen in Table 8. 
In regard to Spanish NGOs in Equatorial Guinea, the Directory of CONGDE (2009) 
provides this information for 2007: 15 NGOs carried out 38 projects with a total value 
of 6.953.857 euros.  
In the planning of the PACI 2009 and 2010 there are remarkable variations in the 
allocation by agents of Spanish aid in Equatorial Guinea. AECID decreases its financing 
percentage from 89.7% in 2009 to 78.1% in 2010 in detriment of the Autonomous 
Communities. These gain relative importance (from 4.2% to 11.1%), as do the Local 
Entities (from 2.9% to 4.6%) and the Universities (increase in 1.7%). 
There are also great variations in the sectoral allocation. In contrast with the 51.3% 
spent on education in 2009, in 2010 only 23.8% is predicted, going through a decrease 
in 27.5 percentage points. Nevertheless, healthcare and reproductive health go from 
32.8% in 2009 to 64.2% in 2010 (a 31.4% increase). There aren’t any planned 
contributions for water supply or gender equality for 2010, in which 2.6% and 0.3% 
were respectively spent in 2009. There are also less contributions for infrastructure and 
economic services and for productive sectors, which pass to hold 0.9% instead of the 
3.1% they had before. The criterion behind these changes is something worth analyzing 
deeply. 
 
4.1 EDUCATION AND HEALTHCARE AID. 
As we can see in Graph 4, ODA in Equatorial Guinea for education (code CRS110) and 
healthcare (code CRS 120) has been dominated by Spanish contributions, as we have 
mentioned before. Multilateral aid has made very few contributions: a total 0.66 million 
constant dollars in education and 14.63 million in healthcare. Practically the entire 
amount is due to the donation of the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria in 2006, which reached 13.95 million dollars. What we pursue in this section is 
to know whether or not these contributions have lead to an improvement of the 
education and health indicators. All the literature on the effectiveness of aid highlights 
that the effects can be heterogeneous among countries and sectors. For this reason, the 
case study of a country like Equatorial Guinea has important consequences, especially 
for Spanish cooperation. 
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Graph 6. Evolution of ODA commitments on Education and Healthcare. 
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Education aid. 
The data provided by UNESCO and the World Bank on education in Equatorial Guinea 
is scarce. We don’t have time series with annual observations. In addition, each variable 
has a different number of observations, which complicates the quantitative analysis even 
more. Even so, we can still make the following remark: the data of educational results 
hardly changes in time, and does so quite erratically. 
In Equatorial Guinea, elementary education starts at seven years of age and consits of 
five grades. Middle School begins at twelve at lasts another seven years. 
We have more data for the years 1999-2005. During this period, the rate of students that 
finished elementary education went down from 65.7% in 1999 to 47.8% in 2003. It later 
grew up to 58.2% in 2005, still below the 1999 percentage. The gross rate of enrollment 
in elementary education went from 142.1% in 1999 to 122% in 2005. The same rate for 
secondary education moved from 33.03% in 1999 to 31.93% three years later. The 
college rate of enrollment was 2.7% in 2000 (only available figure). So to say, there is a 
reduction, or at best a paralysis of the enrollment indicators. We know even less about 
the quality of the education (grades, absence of teachers and students, vocational 
training, etc.), but we do know that the aid, both international and Spanish, hasn’t 
stopped arriving, year by year. Between 1999 and 2008 Spain spent 10.64 million 
dollars on secondary education and 12.20 on tertiary. What has been the result of these 
transferred quantities? The answer needs a deep evaluation13. 
                                                 
 
13 The first evaluation that Spanish cooperation did in 1998, which first used the Evaluation 
Methodology, was on Equatorial Guinea’s cocoa sector. It was a final evaluation and was done with the 
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On the other hand, the absence of results for the educational variables also affects the 
slight increase in the educational public expense. Education receives annually 0.6% of 
Equatorial Guinea’s GDP, which increased 39% during 2000-2007. Such an increase 
should have carried on an enormous flow of new annual resources. However, the figures 
of public expense percentage used on education were 1.62% in 2001, 3.97% in 2002 
and 4.01% in 2003 (no more observations). We don’t know the total level of public 
spending nor the exact amount of public educational expense, but we do know the 
amount of the public consumption expense. In 2000 it was 57.3 million current dollars, 
and 287.6 million in 2007. That means it grew 26%, being multiplied 5 times. Has this 
outstanding increase brought any benefit for the country’s education? It seems unlikely 
and again requires a deep analysis. The econometric studies with panels of countries 
over the effect of aid for education on variables like the enrolment rates or the 
completion of elementary studies have shown favourable results for the impact of aid. 
Oppositely, there’s much literature proving that the public expense on education doesn’t 
improve academic results (grades, class attendance) nor does it increase enrolment rates 
(including children, second MDG) or elementary school completion rates. Recent 
studies like Michaelowa & Weber (2007a, b), Wolf (2007) and Dreher et al (2008) have 
proven that per capita aid has a slightly positive impact on enrolment in all three 
educational levels. Asiedu & Nandwa (2007) obtain positive results of aid on the 
country’s growth rate for primary education in low-income countries and for tertiary 
education in middle-income countries. In low-income countries, both secondary and 
tertiary education aid don’t have a statistically significant association. In middle-income 
countries the statistical impact on the economic growth rate of aid spent on elementary 
and secondary education is negative. This effect is probably explained by the high 
enrolment level in these countries. This makes the returns on GDP not as significant 
because education at these levels and countries isn’t correctly oriented towards 
production. Is Equatorial Guinea an exception or a conformation of these results? 
Guinea doesn’t appear in any of the samples of the mentioned studies. The need of a 
thorough evaluation of the impact of aid on education in Equatorial Guinea can’t be 
denied before we continue to send aid with unknown results14. The coherence with the 
fourth principle of aid quality established by the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005) and 
ratified in Accra (OECD 2008), which is precisely a result oriented aid, requires doing 
so. 
 
Healthcare aid. 
The literature on sectoral effectiveness of aid per capita in healthcare results reveals two 
evidences: that aid is statistically significant in reducing child mortality (Boone 1996; 
Wolf 2007; Mishra & Newhouse 2007) and that it usually stimulates public spending in 
                                                                                                                                               
 
EU (the report is published in MAE 1998). There still hasn’t been a complete evaluation of all the 
Spanish aid in the country. 
14 This refers to results understood as changes in variables that exceed the achieved goals (construction of 
schools, material handed in, financing of college programs, etc.). The results are here interpreted as the 
specific changes in the life of the supposedly poor beneficiaries to which the aid was directed. It’s the 
same as what the Glossary of the DAC (2004:24) defines by “impacts”: “positive or negative long-term 
effects, either primary or secondary, which are produced by a direct or indirect aid intervention, 
intentionally or not”. 
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social sectors including healthcare (Gomanee et al. 2005; Mosley et al 2004). None of 
these studies includes Equatorial Guinea in their samples. The most likely reason is, 
once again, the lack of data. With the few health indicators provided by the World Bank 
and the data on healthcare aid we can learn some interesting facts (Table 9). The data 
continuity period is 2002-2006. I have calculated aid per capita spent on healthcare in 
Equatorial Guinea based on the data of commitments provided by the DAC-CRS. 
Throughout the five years between 2002-2206 the expense on healthcare per inhabitant 
grew an accumulated rate of 24% (from 183 to 440 dollars), whereas the healthcare aid 
per capita of DAC donors grew 30.4% and Spanish aid 36.1%. Summarising, in per 
capita terms healthcare aid grows faster than national healthcare expense. 
In GDP terms healthcare expense in Equatorial Guinea went from 4% in 2001 to 2.1 % 
in 2006 (which implies a cummulative 15% decrease). The private healthcare expense 
also decreased from 0.7% of the GDP to 0.4% (goes down -13.1%), and the public 
healthcare expense from 3.3% to 1.7% (decreasing -15.3%). Given the 2.9% population 
growth (from 5.2 to 5.8 million inhabitants) and the 45% growth in GDP thanks to the 
oil sales, it’s easy to see why in Equatorial Guinea a growth in the national product 
doesn’t lead to social spending on healthcare.  
The absence of data doesn’t let us know if the aid is fungible and diverts public 
healthcare expense to other areas. Anyhow, it’s highly suspected to be so. 
Regarding the healthcare results, the child mortality rates have grown from 120 to 123.6 
for children under one year of age and from 200 to 206 for children smaller than five. 
These figures confirm that healthcare in Equatorial Guinea isn’t adequately covered by 
the government and that aid may be acting as a ‘replacement’. An evaluation is 
necessary, especially for Spanish cooperation, in order to think over these facts and 
continue (or not) to offer a more effective and truly result oriented aid, as we suggested 
for education. 
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Table 9. Health and Aid indicators in Equatorial Guinea. 
 
 Per capita 
healthcare 
expense 
(current US$)
DAC’s 
healthcare 
ODA per 
capita 
Spanish 
healthcare 
ODA per 
capita 
Per capita 
ODA to all 
sectors 
% 
ODA/GNI
Private 
healthcare 
expense 
(% GDP)
Public 
healthcare 
expense 
(% GDP)
Public 
healthcare 
expense (% 
of Public 
Expense) 
Public 
healthcare 
expense (% 
of Total 
Healthcare 
Expense) 
Total 
healthcare 
expense 
(% GDP)
DAC 
Healthcare 
ODA, (mill 
current US$)
Spanish 
healthcare 
ODA (mill 
current US$)
GDP (million 
current US$)
TMI-
1 
TMI-
5 
2002   183 3.3 2.8 36.0 1.7 0.7 3.3 20.7 81.5 4.0 1.74 1.45 2141 120.0 200.0
2003   127 4.9 4.7 36.3 1.5 0.7 1.4 8.7 65.5 2.1 2.62 2.52 2952 .. ..
2004   191 6.2 5.9 49.2 1.3 0.6 1.3 6.9 70.8 1.9 3.39 3.27 5241 .. ..
2005   233 8.9 8.5 62.7 0.9 0.5 1.1 6.9 71.8 1.6 5.04 4.82 8217 123.0 205.0
2006   440 9.7 9.5 41.9 0.5 0.4 1.7 6.9 80.4 2.1 5.63 5.57 9603 123.6 206.0
Growth rate 
2002-06 24.5% 30.4%    36.1% 3.9% -26.4% -13.1% -15.3% -24.0% -0.3% -14.9% 34.1% 40.0% 45.5%
Source: World Bank (WDI) and OECD-DAC, CRS On line, 
5. IMPROVEMENT SUGGESTIONS. 
How can Spain assume an efficient leadership in external aid for Equatorial Guinea in 
the frame of the new progresses in aid effectiveness? The European General Agreement 
on development and aid effectiveness, the international division of donor labour, the 
budget support, donor coordination, transferred and triangular cooperation, South-South 
cooperation, emerging donors such as China, pose challenges to traditional aid. 
Internally, poverty and inequality (quantitatively unknown) are undeniable challenges, 
more so when the oil income is large enough to make the country’s leader promise that 
by 2020 Equatorial Guinea will be a developed country (EPA 2009). 
In this section we offer suggestions for the aid reform in line with the guidelines and 
commitments made by the international community in the Paris Declarations and Accra 
(OECD 2005, 2008).  
The first step is to lucidly admit the faults of the present cooperation system. The 
indirect effects are clear, like the use that the regime and the main political party makes 
of funds and goods originally used for aid. The ODA that passes through the ministries, 
congress or ‘official’ entities feeds the dictatorship’s regime and doesn’t help the poor. 
Courses, scholarships or technical assistances -except for some- go to nguemists and the 
“Mongomo clan” because all of the State’s administration is in hands of the dictator’s 
party. Other ways of canalizing funds such as NGOs and churches, aren’t free of the 
risk of maintaining the status quo. If education and healthcare is already carried out by 
Spanish cooperation, why take it as a public good? The moral dilemmas are very 
explicit in Equatorial Guinea because it seems as if decisions were always made 
according to the lesser evil (not leaving the poor population without healthcare and 
education, in exchange of intensifying the unjust political system and the lack of 
liberties). If our behaviour isn’t ‘diplomatic’ we may lose projects or damage the 
existing ones. But then, we would be accepting the ‘blackmail’ of the use and sale of aid 
materials and the giving of scholarships to those who less need them (burocrats of the 
nguemist clan and their violent power circles). Equatorial Guinea is a perfect example 
of the complexity and difficulty of the external promotion of a human development that 
must be endogenous. How can we help a country that has leaders that aren’t willing to 
enhance their population’s liberties, opportunities and capacities?  
That’s what ODA is about, promoting transitions to greater stages of freedom (press, 
association, syndication, strike, opinion and public expression; to point out the most 
evident needs in Equatorial Guinea) and Human Rights fulfilment in inefficient 
institutional (and geographical) backgrounds. 
Placing ourselves in a more likely situation and assuming that not cooperating is worse 
than cooperating (assumption that must be studied) we point out a few ideas to improve 
the current situation. 
A first scenario to take into consideration is to fix a time limit after which there would 
be no more external aid sent, at least in the present quantities and instruments. President 
Obiang’s own desire of being a developed country by 2020 could be a good limit. Ten 
more years of aid, and then ‘graduation’. This scenario would enable a mid-term 
political dialogue where the commitments made by both parties would be revised after 
the first five years. The existence of a time limit could put some pressure on the 
government. They could adopt a true commitment to encourage human development in 
the guinean population and reallocate more efficiently the oil income to build and 
improve the basic social services. Ideally, the process must follow the principles of the 
 31
Paris Declaration. The political priorities should be expressed in a document that 
covered the strategy for poverty reduction. This document must include the expected 
results, the domestic investment commitments and the needs for aid in each sector in 
order to achieve these results. The elaboration of an MOU between the government and 
the donors (it seems reasonable for Spain to play the role of lead donor in this process) 
would gather the cooperation conditions for their monitoring and evaluation. The 
system of indicators and verification sources must be extremely precise and ‘technical’, 
given the political conditions of the country and the lack of transparency and 
accountability. 
In case of not completing this results frame (in line with the spirit and letter of the III 
Director Plan of Spanish Cooperation 2009-2012) withdrawing from the country 
shouldn’t be excluded. Plenty of donors have abandoned the official cooperation in 
countries where they had worked many years in pursuance of greater efficiency and 
concentration of geographic priorities (for example Sweden in Nicaragua and Honduras, 
see Schulz 2007, Puerto and Schulz 2009). The lessons learned in these experiences 
must be taken into account, especially the incapacity (or indifference) of other donors to 
assume responsibilities with the target population sustained by the ‘leaving’ donor. It 
appears to be clear that the consequences of the conditionalities must be undergone by 
the bad rulers and not by the poor population. However, the ‘weak’ conditionality that 
seems to be applied by Spanish cooperation (Prado Lallande 2010) shouldn’t be seen as 
the most suitable option for Equatorial Guinea, unless there was a drastical change in 
the leading elite’s orientation of liberties. 
The possibility of Spain’s leadership as lead donor fits perfectly in the setting of 
international donor labour division that the EU is performing. But the combination of 
diplomacy and high policy coherence should be the key principle of Spanish 
cooperation. Thanks to its volume, historical tradition and experience Spain could 
assume this role successfully. Coordination with American aid would be crucial, at least 
for two reasons. First of all, because the US is the country with greatest influence and 
economic interests in the area, and secondly, due to the experience that it’s gaining 
through USAID as manager of the ‘Social Fund’ created by the guinean government to 
finance educational and healthcare projects and attain a better redistribution of the oil 
income. 
The aid formula coordinated between donors and subject to a tight conditionality, could 
offer some results, but it’s uncertain that the country would in fact accomplish the 
minimum standards of implementation of this tool. Observing the destination of the 
funds would have to be so strict that it’s highly unlikely that the local government 
would accept it. In any case, Spain and the other donors should condition their aid to ex 
post results, in agreement with the Paris Declaration, the Action Agenda of Accra and 
the international Aid Based-on-Results or Cash on Delivery suggestions, which 
encourage aid to be delivered after reforms and achieved outcomes. 
It’s very important for donors to act in a harmonic and accorded way. It may happen 
that a program negotiated by a donor under the results conditionality can be used by 
another to obtain commercial benefits in the country. China’s case, as a non-OECD 
donor, and therefore without the pressure of mutual monitoring within the DAC, is the 
best example to show the need of a collective accorded intervention in Equatorial 
Guinea. 
The tools which appear to be more necessary for the aid’s success before 2020 are three. 
In first place, budget planification and control. It’s important to reduce the volatility of 
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aid, especially in sectors that need a bigger time frame to attain results (education, 
healthcare, water supply and sanitation among others). The Guinean government and all 
the cooperation organisms that operate in the country must carry out an agreed 
coordination, resulting from the uncertainty reduction generated by an annual budget. 
The coming up elaboration of the Country Plan (or Spain-Equatorial Guinea 
Association Framework Agreement) should reach this goal of stability and 
predictability. 
Another step is to increase the mutual accountability. The Spanish cooperation 
commission of the Congress receives and analyzes thoroughly the cooperation in 
Equatorial Guinea. The monitoring of the Country Plan, along with the annual report of 
policy coherence (established in 2006 but never completed except for that year), would 
be the basic information documents for the Congress. The NGOs operating in the 
country should multiply their informative actions in the country, especially in terms of 
monitoring of results. 
In third place, it seems inevitable to make a thorough evaluation of the cooperation in 
the country. Starting from this diagnosis of successes and errors of all the actions 
carried out up to the present, the setting up of a guideline along with specific sectoral 
goals and well constructed verification sources must enable a mid-term (2015) and final 
(2020) evaluation. This document will give the basis for deciding whether or not to 
continue with the aid, modify the strategy (partially or completely) or finish with 
official cooperation. 
It’s also necessary to analyze the role NGOs have played in the country. For many years 
the presence of “FERE” (Spanish Federation of the Religious Education) in education 
and of “FRS” (Healthcare Religious Federation) in healthcare has been continuous. 
Some mid-term evaluations have been recently carried out over the agreements made 
with AECID of both these catholic organizations and “Ayuda en Acción” (Action Aid). 
It would be advantageous if these evaluations lead to specific Improvement Plans and 
transparent monitoring. The publication of evaluation reports, executive summaries, and 
improvement plans, like those of EuropeAid or the Sweedish cooperation agency, is a 
specific action that could be implanted immediately. This would allow other 
independent organizations in Spain or Equatorial Guinea to keep track of the progress in 
cooperation. In both countries the population’s unawareness of the operations and 
evaluations of the aid is quite large, and may work as a spur for a greater transparency 
and efficiency of results. There’s a very likely hypothesis, reflected by the interviews 
made for this investigation, although not empirically contrasted, that needs to be taken 
seriously. It says that NGOs, particularly Spanish ones, are substituting responsibilities 
of the State and produce resource fungibility in public services like healthcare and 
education. A country that has become exponentially richer thanks to oil sale must offer 
basic public services even though tradition, inertia or post-colonial mentality has left 
that, up to now, in Spanish hands. 
Equatorial Guinea can be an appropriate place to innovate with agents and tools. 
Universities (with solid reports on the country’s sociopolitical and economical situation 
spread throughout Spain and Guinea), trade unions (which do not truly exist in Guinea), 
mass media firms and foundations (radios, TV programs, telephone, internet) can make 
a huge contribution to the development process. Frequently, we tend to think only in 
classical tools like health programs, water supply and sanitation, or education and other 
possibilities like all those related with securing the civil society of Guinea aren’t taken 
into account. This could simply be done by providing the population with non-
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manipulated information on their county’s real situation. If cooperation doesn’t reflect 
the social situation of a country it becomes an accomplice of this situation. That’s why 
it’s so difficult -and at the same time urgent- to take a new line of action in Equatorial 
Guinea. The next International Cooperation Framework Agreement must bravely face 
the challenge. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS. 
The main findings of the study are that the ODA has been a hardly predictable, 
relatively stable, counter-cyclical flow and that it does have a stabilizing effect on 
Equatoguineans product. The FDI, on the other hand is much more volatile and pro-
cyclical, although it shares the stabilizing effect of the ODA. For every million dollars 
of the FDI, GDP grew 0.1%. Development aid, on the contrary, doesn’t have a 
statistically significant impact if we consider the time period 1985-2006. But it does in 
1985-1995. Every additional million dollars of ODA made the GDP grow 1.3% in that 
period. 
Spain ought to lucidly admit the faults of the present cooperation system. The 
combination of diplomacy and high policy coherence should be the key principle of 
Spanish cooperation. The next International Cooperation Framework Agreement should 
fixed a deadline (the last goal of development cooperation is abandon a country due to 
its progress) and a results-based conditionality. Mutual impact indicators must be 
established and a “cash-on-delivery” model should be used as a dynamic structure of 
incentives. 
An in-depth evaluation of the Development Cooperation system and recent on-going 
evaluations of the Spanish NGOs and AECID agreements can shed valuable light for 
improvements. Innovation should be the “lemma” for new agents and instruments. The 
study has showed that “business as usual” should not be sustainable if human 
development and poverty reduction are the true goals of donors foreign aid. 
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